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Inference in an Approach to Discourse Anaphora
Abstract
Inference is discussed as a factor in the derivation of
non-explicit antecedents and referents for three types of
discourse anaphora - definite pronouns, "one"-anaphora and verb
phrase ellipsis. This derivation process is seen as being part
of the normal process of text-understanding. It is claimed that
the use of non-explicit antecedents and referents for anaphora
depends on a contract between speaker and listener. This
contract requires that if the speaker uses an anaphoric
expression whose antecedent or referent was inferentially
derived, the listener both can and will make the same inference.
Insofar as it is shown that many of these inferences rely on one
of the few things explicitly available to both speaker and
listener alike - i.e., the form of the utterance - the
identification of a sentence's formal properties becomes a matter
of cognitive concern.
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Inference & Discourse Anaphora
1. Introduction
If one considers the question of what is accessible to
anaphoric reference in English, one soon finds that none of the
simple answers - text strings, pieces of syntactic structure,
constituents of logical form -is adequate. The following
examples should provide sufficient grounds for this claim. For
each underlined anaphoric expression, the intuitively correct
antecedent is just as intuitively neither a substring nor a
constituent of a syntactic or "logical form" representation of
the sentence.
(1) Wendy is going to Spain and Bruce is going to Crete, but
in neither case do I know why 0.
0 = that person is going where s/he is going
(2) Irv and Martha wanted to dance together, but Martha's
mother said that she couldn't 0.
0 = dance with Irv
(3) Each 3rd-grade girl brought Wendy a brick. On a dare,
she stacked them into a 10-foot high wall.
them = the set of bricks, each of which some 3rd-grade
girl brought to Wendy
(4) Blend a cup of flour with some butter. Moisten it with
some milk, then knead it into a ball.
it = the flour-butter mixture.
(5) Whether Bruce buys a used car or a moped, his brother
will want to borrow it.
it = the used car Bruce will have brought if Bruce buys a
used car or the moped Bruce will have bought otherwise
(6) I have a '71 Ch. Figeac, a '76 Fleurie, a '71 Ockfener
Bockstein and a '75 Durkheimer Feuerberg in the cellar.
Shall we have the German ones for dinner tonight?
ones = wines
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(Notice that these examples span a variety of anaphoric
processes: sluicing (example 1), verb phrase ellipsis
(example 2), definite pronoun anaphora (examples 3-5) and
"one"-anaphora (example 6). Thus it should be clear that the
existence of non-explicit antecedents is not an isolated
phenomenon.)
Now one way of accounting for the existence of non-explicit
antecedents in discourse is to say that "inference" is
responsible. However as it is obvious that the discourse does
not tell the listener explicitly what inferences to make, then
one must still explain the fact that to a remarkable degree, both
speaker and listener are reasoning in similar ways. This raises
the following two questions:
1. What is it that guarantees similar reasoning on the part
of both discourse participants?
2. Is there a limit to the kind of reasoning that thediscourse participants might be willing to perform in
order to derive antecedents?
My primary objective in this paper is to respond to the first
question. In doing so, I shall characterize some very productive
inferences which can account for many of the non-explicit
antecedents of anaphoric expressions. While I shall not respond
directly to the second question, my hope is that by identifying
such inferences, it may become answerable as well.
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In the first part of this paper I shall be discussing two
types of "deep anaphora" (cf. Hankamer & Sag (1976)) - definite
pronouns and "one"-anaphora - and in the second, a single type of
"surface anaphora" - verb phrase ellipsis. I have made this
division so as to provoke thinking about other types of "deep"
anaphora - e.g., "do it" anaphora, "sentential it" anaphora -
along the lines presented in the first part of the paper, and
about other types of "surface" anaphora - e.g., sluicing,
stripping, etc. - along the lines presented in the second. <*1>
2. Inference and Deep Anaphora
2.1 Discourse Models
One possible response to the question of what would guarantee
similar reasoning on the part of both discourse participants is to
invoke the notion of a discourse model - a concept frequently
encountered in Artificial Intelligence literature on natural
language understanding. This notion permits a clean account to be
given of both the role of inference in text-understanding
(Collins, Brown & Larkin, 1977) and of the items accessible to
"deep"-anaphora.
Informally, a discourse model may be described as the set of
entities "naturally evoked" by a discourse and linked together by
<*1>. This paper is culled from the author's doctoral
dissertation (Nash-Webber, 1978) to which interested readers are
referred for further discussion.
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the relations they participate in. These I will call discourse
entities. (I can see no basic difference between what I am
calling "discourse entities" and what Karttunen (1976) has called
"discourse referents". My alternate terminology rests on wanting
to keep "referent" a separate technical term.) The entities
"naturally evoked" by the discourse may have the properties of
individuals, sets, stuff, events, activities, etc.
In order to become familiar with the notion of entities
"naturally evoked" by a discourse, consider the following sentence.
(7) Each 3rd-grade girl brought a brick to Wendy's house.
Then consider each continuation in (8a-e). In each case, I would
label the referent of the definite pronoun (i.e., "she", "it" or
"they") an entity "naturally evoked" by sentence (7).
(8)a. She certainly was surprised.
she = Wendy
b. They knew she would be surprised.
they = the set of 3rd-grade girls
c. She piled them on the front lawn.
them = the set of bricks, each of which some 3rd-grade
girl brought to Wendy's house
d. She was surprised that they knew where it was.
it = Wendy's house
e. Needless to say, it surprised her.
it = the brick-presenting event
It is my assumption that one objective of discourse is to
communicate a model: the speaker has a model of some situation
which, for one reason or another, s/he wishes to communicate to a
- 4 -
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listener. Thus the ensuing discourse is an attempt by the speaker
to direct the listener in synthesizing a similar model.
Formally, a discourse model is a collection of entities,
their properties and the relations they participate in. At any
point in the discourse moreover, the discourse model validates the
sequence of propositions embodied in the discourse up to that
point. Now a speaker is usually not able to communicate at once
all the relevant properties and relations associated with one of
these discourse entities. That task requires multiple acts of
reference. When the speaker wants to refer to an entity in his or
her discourse model, s/he may do so with a definite pronoun. In
so doing, the speaker assumes (1) that on the basis of the
discourse thus far, a similar entity will be in the listener's
(partially formed) model and (2) that the listener will be able to
access and identify that entity via the minimal cues of pronominal
reference. A definite pronoun then has a referent, which is an
entity in the speaker's discourse model which s/he presumes to
have a counterpart in the listener's discourse model.
Alternatively, the speaker may refer to a discourse entity by
constructing a description of it in terms of some or all of its
known properties and/or relations (e.g., "a red balloon", "Mary's
mother", etc.). This may result in an entity being evoked into
the listener's discourse model having at least the properties (or
participating in the relations) mentioned in the given
description. So while a discourse entity may be the referent of a
- 5 -
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definite pronoun, the pronoun's antecedent will be that
description conveyed by the immediately preceding text. The
relationship between the discourse or the spatio-temporal context
on the one hand, and the referents of definite pronouns on the
other is thus an indirect one, mediated by the discourse
participants' models. The discourse, in communicating property
and relation information, serves as one possible source of
antecedent descriptions and thus, indirectly, as one possible
source of referents.
As for the role of "one"-anaphora (example (6)) in this
scheme of things, I am assuming that a "one"-anaphor substitutes
for a description. This description is in turn its antecedent.
There are at least two possible reasons a speaker may have for
using a "one"-anaphor in discourse: brevity and contrast. When a
speaker builds a noun phrase around a "one"-anaphor, any
additional modifiers in the noun phrase can serve to differentiate
and contrast the current description with some set of alternatives
which the speaker perceives or believes the listener to be aware
of. Where the anaphor-containing noun phrase is being used
referentially (i.e., to evoke or pick out a particular entity in
the listener's discourse model), those modifiers serve to
distinguish the noun phrases's intended referent from other
entities in the model. (This last idea derives from Olson
(1970).)
- 6 -
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2.2 Sources of Antecedents and Referents
The role of inference in the scheme becomes clear as one
considers how discourse entities can be evoked into the listener's
discourse model. There are three such ways in which discourse
entities can be evoked: (1) linguistically, from the explicit
discourse; (2) perceptually, from the immediate spatio-temporal
environment; and (3) inferentially, reasoning from the existence
of particular other discourse entities. (Perceptual evocation of
discourse entities is another way of looking at the "pragmatically
controlled" definite pronouns discussed in Hankamer & Sag (1976).)
Inference also has a role in the formation of descriptions,
in that the same three sources as above provide their raw
material. The first source of descriptions is the discourse
itself, with the language inducing particular ways of viewing and
describing things. These things may or may not correspond then to
entities in the listener's discourse model. Notice, for example,
that after sentence (9) one would not presume any tie-dyed
T-shirts to be in that model, since the original sentence is a
negative assertion.
(9) Wendy didn't give either boy a tie-dyed T-shirt.
However, the existence of any referent is irrelevant to the
description "tie-dyed T-shirt" being a possible antecedent for
"one" in sentence (10).
(10) However, she did give Janet a red one.
- 7 -
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The second source of descriptions is the external
environment. As mentioned above, an entity may be evoked into the
speaker or listener's discourse model as a result of what s/he
perceives. How it is described will depend upon how s/he
classifies that perception linguistically. As well as it can be
presented on paper, the following is an example of a "one"-anaphor
substituting for the speaker's description of some sense
perception.
(11) [Bonnie goes up to a balloon man at the circus and says]
"Do you have a blue one with green stripes."
one = balloon
Again as with discourse entities, the third source of
descriptions is inference. The speaker assumes the listener can
and will follow the speaker's unspoken lead to infer:
1. from description dl of some entity in his or her
discourse model, another description d2 of that same
entity;
2. from entities el,...,eg with descriptions d1 ,...,d
respectively, a new disc urse entity ek with descriptio
dk*
For instance, in sentence 6 of the introductory set of examples,
the speaker assumes that the listener both can and will infer from
the description "Ch. Figeac '71" another description for that same
entity - namely "wine". Similarly for the descriptions "'76
Fleurie", "Ockfener Bockstein '75" and "Durkheimer Feuerberg '75".
The "one"-anaphor then substitutes for the non-explicit shared
description "wine".
- 8 -
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In summary, inference can be a source of both non-explicit
discourse entities and non-explicit descriptions, provided that
the following contract between speaker and listener is maintained:
if the speaker uses an anaphoric expression whose antecedent or
referent was inferentially derived, s/he must have reason to
believe that the listener both can and will make the same
inference (even if only to resolve the anaphoric term). The
problem now becomes one of either characterizing or enumerating
such inferences.
The first thing to observe is that not all chains of
reasoning will produce as side effects either new discourse
entities or new descriptions. For example, consider the following
as the first sentence of a discourse.
(12) You won't believe this, but I saw Wendy's mother at the
Led Zeppelin movie last night, and he wasn't with her.
Who does the speaker presume the listener will identify as the
referent of "he" in this example? It is clear that the text
itself is no help. <*2>
<*2>. I unsuccessfully intended the pronoun to refer to Wendy's
father. The point is that merely an "if mother, then father"
axiom
(Vx) [(Ey) . y mother-of(x)]
==> [(Ez) . z = father-of(x)]
i.e., "for any x, if there exists an individual who is x's
mother, then there exists an individual who is x's father", true
as it may be in the current world, is still not sufficient to
yield a referent for "he" in sentence (12). That is, "he" cannot
refer to Wendy's father solely by virtue of mentioning her
mother.
- 9 -
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The second thing to observe is that the range of inferences
capable of providing referents for each type of deep anaphora will
vary. For example, compare the following two examples: the first
contains a definite pronoun, the second, an anaphoric definite
description.
(13) Wendy ran into the kitchen and opened it. (14) Wendy ran
into the kitchen and opened the refrigerator.
Here "the refrigerator" refers to the discourse entity describable
as "the refrigerator in the just-mentioned kitchen that Wendy ran
into". This entity, inferable by a highly salient and rarely
false "if kitchen then refrigerator" axiom, is not accessible via
the minimal cues of pronominal reference. (In Artificial
Intelligence terms, the saliency of a collection of inferences is
ensured by their being packaged together into a data-structure
called a frame, schema or script. In this paper I shall only be
concerned with inferences capable of providing antecedents and/or
referents for pronominal or elliptic anaphora. For interesting
discussions of anaphoric definite descriptions, see Bullwinkle
(1977), Charniak (1973), Grosz (1977), Hobbs (1976) and Rieger
(1974).)
Now unfortunately, there are no hard and fast rules which
delimit the class of inferences which can evoke acceptable
antecedents or referents for definite pronoun or "one"-anaphora.
In general, the success of a particular inference in evoking a
discourse entity or a description will depend on (1) its saliency
in the particular context; (2) its contingency (i.e., how likely
- 10 -
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it is to be valid in that context); and (3) the pressure of
simultaneous demands on the listener's limited processing
resources.
However, while I cannot characterize in terms of its defining
properties the class of relevant inferences, I can list explicitly
some very productive inferences which would have to be included in
any account of non-explicit antecedents. While space limits me to
presenting only three such inferences here, others can be found in
Nash-Webber (1978). (In the following, I will present the axiom
schemata used in "inferring antecedents and referents" in terms of
a modified predicate calculus whose augmentations include the
abstraction (or "lambda") operator ( ), the iota operator ( )
for forming definite descriptions, equality, restricted
quantification and the set operator ({..}). To understand the
factors motivating this choice of representation, see
Nash-Webber(1978).)
2.3 Examples of Productive Inferences
Of the three inference schemata I shall discuss here, the
first two can provide non-explicit antecedents and referents for
definite pronouns, while the third provides antecedents for
"one"-anaphora. The first inference schema (presented in a
somewhat simplified form here) applies to existentially quantified
propositions in cases where the existential quantifier has widest
scope.
- 11 -
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(Ex:A) .Px==> (Ey) . y = z: Az & Pz & evoke Sj,zQ-- Sj
i.e., informally, if a proposition Sj states that there is a
member of class A for which P is true, then there exists an
individual describable as "the A which P's which was mentioned (or
evoked) by Sj". Since a unique description can be ascribed to
this individual, it can be referred to anaphorically with a
definite pronoun. For example,
(15)a. Wendy ate an apple.
b. It had a worm inside.
Sentence 15a. can be represented simply as
(Ex:Apple) . Ate Wendy, x
Since this matches the left hand side of the above axiom schema,
it follows that
(Ey) . y = zz: Apple z & Ate Wendy,z & evoke Sl5a,z
i.e., there exists an individual describable as "the apple which
Wendy ate which was mentioned in sentence 15a". The individual is
the discourse entity referred to by "it" in sentence 15b. and the
above definite description is its antecedent.
The second inference schema for definite pronouns applies
whenever a non-negative sentence contains an existentially
quantified noun phrase within the scope of a universal
(Vx:A)(Ey:B) . P x,y
==> (Ez) . z = {w|Bw & (Ex:A) . P x,w}
i.e., informally, if for every A there exists a B such that P is
true of the pair, then there exists an individual describable as
"the set of B's for which there is some A that stands in relation
- 12 -
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P to it". Since a unique description is ascribable to this
individual, it can be referred to with a definite pronoun. For
example,
(16)a. Each boy gave Wendy a shirt.
b. None of them fit.
Sentence 16a. can be represented simply as
(Vx:Boy) (Ey:Shirt) . Gave x,Wendy,y
Since this matches the left-hand side of the second axiom schema,
it follows that
(Ez) . z = {wlShirt w & (Ex:Boy) . Gave x,Wendy,w}
i.e., there exists an individual describable as "the set of
shirts, each of which some boy gave to Wendy". This is the
discourse entity referred to as "they" in example 16b.
The third inference schema I will discuss produces
non-explicit antecedents for "one"-anaphora. Consider example
(6), repeated here:
(6) I have a '71 Ch. Figeac, a '76 Fleurie, a '71 Ockfener
Bockstein and a '75 Durkheimer Feuerberg in the cellar.
Shall we have the German ones for dinner?
In this example, the speaker has turned an explicit set
description (i.e., the presented list) into an implicit set
description (i.e., one based on a defining property) and then used
the latter description as an antecedent for "one"-anaphora. In
doing so, the speaker presumes the listener is both able and
willing to do the same. (That is, the speaker appeals to the
"inference contract" mentioned in the previous section.) The
unanswered question is why such an inference from explicit to
- 13 -
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implicit set description should occur and moreover be predictable.
<*3>
3. Inference and Surface Anaphora
"Surface anaphors" are so called because they are seen to be
purely surface phenomena. The primary condition for a successful
surface anaphor-antecedent pair (cf. Hankamer & Sag (1976) and Sag
(1976)) is that the antecedent forms a coherent structural unit at
the level of surface syntax or the level of logical form (subject
to some type of Backward Anaphor Constraint). However, that
condition is not fulfilled in the following examples which
illustrate different types of surface anaphora.
Sluicing
(18) Wendy is going to Spain and Bruce is going to Crete, but
in neither case do I know why 0.
0 = that person is going where s/he is going
"Do so" Anaphora
(19) Wendy's car was repaired today by the same guy who had
done so last week. (after Kaplan (1976))
do so = repair Wendy's car
Verb Phrase Ellipsis
(20) I can walk and I can chew gum. Ford can 0 too, but not
at the same time.
0 = walk and chew gum
<*3>. One might note in passing that the first two inference
schemata depend solely on the form of an utterance, while this
third one depends on its content as well. Thus world knowledge
can be seen to play a part (although, I would argue, a small one)
in deriving possible antecedents as well as in choosing between
them.
- 14 -
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(21) China is a country that Nixon wants to visit, and he will
0 too, if he gets an invitation soon.
0 = visit China
The problem is that of accounting for such exceptions to the
above constraint on surface anaphor-antecedent pairs. One way to
do so is to again invoke inference. In the remainder of this
section, I shall first sketch, albeit briefly, an approach to verb
phrase ellipsis based on identity of predication at the level of
logical form. I shall then argue that inference can play a part
in deriving additional logical forms whose predicates can serve as
antecedents for ellipsed verb phrases. I shall illustrate this
claim with two examples. Others can be found in Nash-Webber
(1978).
Now if examples such as those above are ignored, the approach
to verb phrase ellipsis (or "verb phrase deletion" - VPD)
presented in Sag (1976a&b) provides an adequate account. Sag's
thesis is that verb phrase ellipsis is conditioned by identical
predicates (rather than by identical VPs or identical substrings)
in a logical form representation of the two clauses involved.
(Identity here is determined modulo differences in the names of
bound variables, i.e., "alphabetic variance".) This logical form
representation makes essential use of the lambda operator both to
bind variables and to form complex predicates which may themselves
contain quantifiers and logical connectives. For example, Sag
(1976a) assigns the sentence "John scratched his arm" the two
logical form representations
- 15 -
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a. John i , )(x)(x scratched his i arm)
b. John i , "(x) (x scratched x's arm)
That there are two possible logical forms for this sentence
explains the ambiguity to be found in a subsequent ellipsed verb
phrase sentence like
Fred did 0 too.
(Did what? Scratched his own arm or scratched John's?) Sag
claims that
With respect to a sentence S, VPD can delete any VP in S
whose representation at the level of logical form is a
lambda-expression that is an alphabetic variant of another
lambda-expression present in the logical form of S or in
the logical form of some other sentence S' which precedes S
in the discourse. (Sag 1976a)
In short, Sag shows that by looking at sentences in terms of
the predicate-argument relations they express, a clean account can
be given of verb phrase ellipsis (barring for now the initial set
of examples). This in turn gives credence to the psychological
reality of some type of "logical representation" within the dual
processes of text generation and comprehension.
But if the process of forming a logical representation is
part of the normal process of understanding discourse, then it is
possible that alternative ways of understanding a sentence or
sequence of sentences or even valid, salient implications of
sentences may also provide lambda-predicates for verb phrase
ellipsis. And this is the point I want to stress: whereas
Hankamer & Sag's condition implies a very static view of verb
phrase ellipsis and other surface anaphora, the above
- 16 -
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process-oriented view suggests that a more plastic approach is
justified. The proviso seems to be that the form of expression of
the derived proposition does not differ radically from the form of
those explicitly given.
Now "alternative ways of understanding" and "valid
implications" are both notions which involve inference. But not
every valid inference provides lambda-predicates accessible to
verb phrase ellipsis. For example, the following axiom relates
the notions of "selling" and "being bought".
(Vx) (Vy) (Vz) . x, X(r) [r sold y to z] ==>
y, X(s) [s was bought by z]
i.e., if any x sold any y to any z, then y was bought by z". <*4>
Notice that this axiom is not sufficient to produce a predicate
"was bought by z", given an explicit predicate "sold y to z" --
(22) Bruce sold a waffle iron to Wendy, and an electric
wok was 0 too.
0 / bought by Wendy
Unfortunately, aside from the caveat that the logical forms
of both the overt sentence(s) and the derived one be "similar" in
some undefined sense, there are no hard and fast rules delimiting
the class of productive inferences relative to verb phrase
ellipsis. What I shall do in the space remaining then is to set
down two inference schemata which account for the two problematic
<*4>. For the remainder of this paper, I will be following Sag's
intuitively clear conventions (Sag 1976a&b) for writing logical
forms. However, for computational purposes at least, a more
rigorous formalism is called for (cf. Nash-Webber (1978)).
- 17 -
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examples of verb phrase ellipsis presented above (examples 20) and
21).
The first inference schema is applicable to a sequence of
propositions with identical subjects and auxiliaries: its effect
is to abstract a new predicate off of the common argument.
y, AUX( X(r)[P r]) & y, AUX( (s)[Q s]) ==>
y, AUX( ~.(t)[P t & Q t])
AUX, the sentence auxiliary, is interpreted as an operator on
predicates, although up to now it has been omitted for simplicity.
Informally, this schema says that if y P's and y Q's, then y P's
and Q's. The propositions on either side of the implication,
while structurally different, are semantically equivalent (at
least with respect to an extensional semantics).
To illustrate the application of this inference schema,
reconsider example (20), repeated below.
(20)a. I can walk and I can chew gum.
b. Jerry can 0 too, but not at the same time.
Sentence (20a) can be represented as <*5>
I, CAN( (r) [r walk]) & I, CAN( )(s) [s chew gum])
Since this matches the left-hand side of the above rule schema, it
follows that
I, Can(\ (t)[t walk & t chew gum])
This has as a constituent the lambda predicate
<*5>. This is actually a simplification of the procedure I
follow throughout Nash-Webber (1978), but the essential ideas are
the same.
- 18 -
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)(t) [t walk & t chew gum]
i.e., "walk and chew gum", which is intuitively the correct
antecedent for the ellipsed verb phrase in sentence (20b). <*6>
The second rule schema I will discuss here applies to
statements of restricted class membership. Its effect is to
derive a new proposition expressing the restriction alone, whose
lambda predicate is accessible to verb phrase ellipsis. Since I
do not have the space here to motivate the notation I need to
express this rule schema formally, I will express it informally as
<x> is a <B> which <y> <C>s ==> <y> <C>s <x>
where <B> is a class description (e.g., elephant, snowmobile,
etc.) and <C> is a verb phrase whose subject is <y>. To
illustrate the application of this rule schema, reconsider example
(21), repeated below.
(21) China is a country that Nixon wants to visit, and
he will 0 too, if he gets an invitation soon.
Proceeding informally, the first clause of (21) matches the
left-hand side of the above rule schema. It therefore follows
that
<*6>. The reason for requiring the conjuncts to have identical
auxiliaries is the strangeness of those examples in which they do
not. For example,
Bruce attended Harvard, and now he is going to MIT.
Fred {did, does, will, is} 0 too.
"Fred did 0 too" seems to imply only that he attended Harvard.
"Fred is 0 too" seems to imply only that he is now going to MIT.
The other auxiliaries just seem bizarre. The sense that Fred
also attended Harvard and is now going to MIT does not seem to be
conveyable using an ellipsed verb phrase.
- 19 -
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Nixon wants to visit China
i.e., using Sag's notation for lambda predicates,
Nixon, ?(r)[r wants {r, ?(s)[s visit China]}]
This has as a constituent the lambda predicate
X(s)[s visit China]
which intuitively is the intended antecedent of the ellipsed verb
phrase in the second clause of (21).
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed the concept of inference as a
factor in the derivation of non-explicit antecedents and referents
for discourse anaphora of both deep and surface varieties. I have
shown how inference schemata can be applied to a formal
representation of the discourse to produce additional formulae
which suggest, through their structure, possible antecedents and
referents. I have tried to motivate this as part of the normal
process of text-understanding. I have claimed the use of
non-explicit antecedents and referents for anaphoric terms depends
on a contract between speaker and listener. This contract
stipulates that if the former uses an anaphoric expression whose
antecedent or referent was inferentially derived, the latter both
can and will make the same inference. Insofar as many of these
inferences rely on one of the few things explicitly available to
both speaker and listener - i.e., the form of the utterance - the
search for productive inferences vis a vis discourse anaphora is a
matter of linguistic concern.
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